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Introduction

The investigation of conceptual behavior has been largely confined to

problems involving nominal and discrete systems of classification.

In

these studies, the subject is presented with a series of stimulus patterns
and is required to learn some principle of classification that relates

specific characteristics of the stimulus population.

When the sequence

of stimuli is controlled by the experimenter the proced\ire is referred to
as the reception paradigm,

A second type of procedure, not as commonly

employed, permits the subject to select his own sequence of stimuli with

the entire stimulus population constantly exposed; this procedure is referred
to as the selection paradigm.

Conceptual problems of the form noteJ above can be analyzed into two

structural components and the behavioral processes relevant to each of

these components can be distinguished (Haygood & Bourne, 19^5 ).

First,

there are the stimulus characteristics which make up the experimenter-

chosen concept.

These are called the relevant attributes; in typical

studies of conceptual behavior in which geometric designs are employed as
stimuli, attributes are values on relevant stimulus dimensions.

Second,

there is the type of concept, represented by some rule for combining or
relating the relevant attributes to define the concept.

For example, a

bidimensional principle for classification might specify that "all red
square figures are examples of the concept".

In such a concept, color

are the relevant
and form are the relevant dimensions, while red and square

attributes or values of the dimension; the conceptual rule is conjunction

or joint presence of attributes.
Corresponding to each of these structural components, relevant
attributes and conceptual rule, are two independent forms of behavior,

1

2
(1) attribute identification, in which the subject attains or discovers

the relevant attributes, and (2) rule learning,

in.

which the subject

discovers the principle for categorizing stimuli in a particular problem,
and acquires the rule in general form so that he can use it in any problem.

Depending upon whether one or both of the structural components are

unknown the subject may be presented with three types of problem:
(1) attribute identification, in which the rule is explained at the outset

to the subject, (2) rule learning, in which the subject is told the relevant

attributes, and (3) complete learning, in which both the rule and relevant

attributes are unknown.

Most of the research on conceptual behavior has been focused on the
investigation of those variables which affect the discovery and utilization
of concepts (concept identification) rather than how concepts are initially

acquired (concept formation).

One of the goals of research within the area

of concept identification is the identification and description of the

methods subjects utilize in solving such tasks.

The major difficulty

in achieving this goal is that much of the solution-directed activity may

be covert and not subject to direct measurement.

The observed behavior is

usually in the form of category responses where the subject designates
each stimulus as an example or nonexample of the concept.

From these re-

trials to
sponses overall measures of behavior such as total errors and

criterion may be obtained.

However, these measures contribute little to

an understanding of the underlying processes involved in reaching solution.
the
What are needed are techniques which produce overt behavior in which

underlying process is manifest.

For example, if subjects are testing a

that
single hypothesis on each trial, then the requirement to state

hypothesis would provide a direct measure of the process.

3

Previous descriptions of how subjects solve conceptual
problems have

been limited primarily to attribute identification.

Several researchers

have adopted the view, stated above, that subjects solve such
problems by
testing various hypotheses about which attributes or dimensions
are relevant
to the solution; a view which has been incorporated with considerable
success in several mathematical models (e.g., Restle, 1962; Bower & Trabasso,
1964).

The success of these models suggests that this view of subjects

as hypothesi's testers might profitably be extended to the more complex

complete learning situation.

Haygood and Bourne (I965) have recently pro-

posed such an extension which has not yet been tested.

The purpose of the

present study was to assess the validity of the Haygood and Bourne descrip-

tion and to examine hypothesis behavior directly in the complete learning
task under several different rules.
Conceptual System

The conceptual system relevant to the present discussion is a system
of constructing concepts based on at most two relevant attributes.

In any

closed stimulus population defined by x independent dimensions with y
values each, there are y^ possible combinations of stimulus attributes.
If X and

2, then two attributes may be selected from separate dimensions

and the entire stimulus population may be mapped onto the four categories,

or contingencies, defined by the presence or absence of these attributes.

For example, if redness (R) and squareness (S) are so chosen, the four
contingencies defined are RS, RS, and RS (where the bar over a symbol
denotes not).

By selecting these attributes as relevant attributes in

defining a concept, the four contingencies are mapped onto a two-response

system where the two responses denote examples and nonexamples of the
concept (positive (+) and negative (-) categories, respectively).

This

mapping defines 1^ nontrivial unique distributions of these four contingenci

into either the positive or negative or negative category (two are
trivial

because they place the entire pop\aation into either the positive or
negative category).

This mapping is shown in Table 1 (reproduced from

Haygood & Bourne, 1965; T and F represent the true false notation used in
symbolic logic).

Since four pairs are identical except for a change of

relevant attributes (B and

C,

E and G, H and I, and L and M) there are

only 10 different rules included in this set.

These 10 fall into five

complementary pairs having the property that any instance which is positive

under one nua±)er of the pair is a negative instance under the other.

These

complementary pairs are presented in Table 2 (modified from Haygood &
Bourne, 19^5).

Theoretical Description of Complete Learning Behavior

Under the complete learning procedure both the rule and relevant
attributes are unknown/

The proposal to be described below rests on the

assumption that the process \inderlying solution in the complete learning
task is similar to that which operates xmder the conditions of rule learning and attribute identification.

This is the

vie-<7

that subjects proceed

to solution by testing hypotheses about relevant aspects of the stimulus

situation.

As noted above, this view has been incorporated in several

mathematical models of attribute identification (e.g., Restle, 1962).
The process during rule learning has not yet been formalized.

Haygood and

Bourne (1965) suggest that in rvle learning subjects are testing hypotheses
about whether contingencies belong in positive or negative response
categories.

This implies that subjects have achieved a receding of the

stimulus population into the four contingencies defined by the presence

been given to them.
or absence of the two relevant attributes which have
possible response assignments
It also implies an awareness that there are l6
negative
obtainable by distributing the four contingencies into positive or
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categories; and that as each new contingency occurs the subject reduces
the set of possible distributions until only the correct one remains.

These

interpretations that hypothesis testing occurs in both rule learning and

attribute identification lead to the follo\7ing description of behavior

under complete learning.

If both the rxile and the relevant attributes are

unknovm, the subject may (a) randomly select a pair of attributes on a

provisional basis for encoding into contingency categories , (b) test for
systematic assignment of the attribute contingencies to response categories,
and (c) reject the pair and select a

ments fails.

nex^

one if test for consistent assign-

The proposed description of behavior under complete learning

thus distinguishes two independent processes corresponding to discovery

of the two

^lnknox^ms;

the testing of hypotheses about the correct pair of

attributes to be coded into contingencies, and the testing of hypotheses

about the distribution of response assignments for contingencies.

Examination of Processes in Complete Learning

One purpose of the present investigation was to examine the proposition
that subjects under the complete learning procedure behave in the manner

described in the preceding section.

Haygood and Bourne have stated that

the validity of their assumptions is very likely limited to those subjects

who have attained mastery of several rules, and even then only under rule
learning where the relevant attributes are known to the subject.

The

major difficulty in providing evidence to support or discredit this view
lies in the fact that the behavior in question is not directly observable.
stimulus population into conIf, however, subjects do come to recede the
"truth
tingencies, that is, to follow what Bourne (196?) has labeled the

table" strategy, then it is reasonable to assume that pret raining in this
procedure should facilitate the learning of such a strategy.
experimental conditions were employed to test this assumption.

Three
One group

8
(CL) was run xander the usual complete learning procedure.

Two other

groups were required to learn the rules v/hile classifying stimuli into

contingencies.

That is, subjects were instructed to categorize stimuli

into four categories on the basis of the presence or absence of the two

relevant attributes, as well as to learn the assignment of contingencies
into positive and negative categories on the basis of a selected conceptual
rule.

These groups differed with respect to whether these two tasks were

learned successively or concurrently.

For the successive group (CC),

subjects first learned contingency coding; that is, they learned to classify

the stimulus population into four categories on the basis of the presence
or absence of the two relevant attributes.

This training was followed by

the learning of response assignments according to the applicable rule.
The concurrent group (CR)

vjas

required to classify stimulus patterns on

each trial into one of the four contingency categories, and also, on the
same trial, to designate the stimulus as either positive or negative.

Bourne (196?) has reported that subjects who were pretrained to classify

stimuli into contingencies performed better on rule learning problems

than subjects not pretrained.

The relevant aspect of the results

v;as

that

the greatest improvement in performance by pretrained subjects was on
those rules typically found to be most difficult for subjects to learn.
The net effect was to reduce differences among conceptual rule learning

performance suggesting that subjects were follovang a similar strategy in
solving each of the different rules; which would be the case if subjects

were, in fact, using the truth table strategy.

The procedure used in the

that subjects in the
present study and that used by Bourne differed in
of the conpresent study also were required to learn response assignments

the rules.
tingencies to positive and negative categories according to

The success of the pretraining procedure was assessed by
presenting half
of the subjects in each group a final problem
under the complete learning

procedure.

A second means of evaluation was to compare performance on

the final problem under complete learning against the
results obtained by

simulating the proposed truth table strategy on a computer.

The details

of the simulation procedure are described below.

Another line of evidence woiad be to actually observe that subjects
are categorizing stimuli on the basis of contingencies rather than infer

such behavior by comparison.

The procedure used to obtain such evidence

is discussed in the next section.

Hypothesis Behavior

Although measures of overall performance (e.g., trials to criterion)
are useful in demonstrating the systematic relationship of behavior to
the m.anipulation of independent variables, they geneally do not contribute
to an understanding of the factors involved in the attainment of solution.

That is, what is the underlying process, what strategy do subjects follow,
in solving conceptual problems?

For example, one independent variable

has been the type of conceptual rule employed.

It is possible that the

type of rule (e.g., conjunction versus disjunction) may affect overall

performance while not changing the strategy employed by the subject.

A

description of the nature of this process must be based on a detailed
analysis of the sequence of steps that subjects follow in order to achieve
success.

For example, given a particular sequence of stimulus-response

outcomes, what was the hypothesis the subject was testing during this

series of trials?

One approach to the determination and evaluation of subject's

strategies that has been adopted is to require subjects on each trial to
state their hypothesis about the solution to the problem.

This procedure

,

10

provides more detailed information about conceptual behavior than
does

overall indices such as mean number of errors.

For example, do subjects

retain the same hypothesis after a correct response, an assumption incorporated into previous mathematical models?

This procedure also enables

the investigator to examine trial-by- trial changes in behavior, as re-

flected by changes in hypotheses from trial to trial as a function of such
variables as the sequence of stimuli.

An obvious problem here is the

possibility that such a requirement itself produces changes in the under-

lying process as reflected by measures of overall performance.

Since

comparison of overall performance with and without the requirement to
state hypotheses had not previously been carried out, this was included
as part of the design of the present study.

The procedure employed in the present study

vras

to divide the subjects

in each of the three training conditions (CL, CC, CR) into three hypothesis

conditions to be described beloxT,

One group (IH) which xdJJL be referred

to as the implicit hypothesis group was presented the entire stimiilus

population one at a time and required to classify each stimulus without
receiving any feedback.

These subjects then classified each of the stimuli

in the U5ual manner, that is, one at a time with informative feedback on

each trial.

This procedure bears some similarity to the blank trials

procedure initiated by Levine (e.g., 1966) which permits the tracking of
a subject's current hypothesis under the assumption that subjects, without

intervening reinforcement, will categorize all stimuli on the basis of a
single hypothesis.

If subjects do, in fact, behave in this manner, this

strategy vrill produce a recognizable, unique series of responses
isomorphic to the stimulus series on those trials.

This procedure would

of
therefore indicate whether subjects are categorizing on the basis

contingencies

11

In order to evaluate whether the requireaient to state hypotheses produces any change in behavior, a second group (NH) was run without the

requirement to state hypotheses.

Finally, a third group (KH) was run

under the more common procedure (e.g., Bourne, I965) wherein on each trial
subjects explicitly verbalized the basis for their response and received
feedback.

This group

included to provde a stronger test of the pos-

X'jas

sibility that the hypothesis requirement alters behavior since it is more

in keeping with the standard procedure,
Trabasso and Bower Model
One mathematical model that is relevant to the present study is a

three-state Markov model that was proposed by Trabasso and Bower (196^)
to describe behavior in four-category concept problems.

The subject's

task in these problems is to classify all stimuli into four categories

on the basis of two relevant dimensions.

For example, if size and form

are relevant and these dimensions take on the values large and small and

circle and square, respectively, then Category 1 may contain all large
circles, Category 2 all large squares, Category 3 all small circles, and

Category ^ all small squares.
Bourne and Restle (1959)

f

According to a hjrpothesis proposed by

subjects solve the four-category problem by

learning two binary subproblems.

In the example given above, the two

subproblems are associated with the size and form dimensions.

The size

subproblem is that large patterns are in categories 1 or 2 and small
patterns are in categories 3 or

The form subproblem is that circles

in categories 2 or ^.
are in categories 1 or 3 and squares are

The

All-or-None learning
Trabasso and Bower model assumes that there are two

processes going on concvirrently, one per subproblem.

The model does not

of any trial
distinguish between the subproblems so that at the beginning

12

the subject may be characterized as having
solved either 0, 1, or 2 of
the subproblems.

Corresponding to each of these levels of
knowledge,

there are three states of a Markov chain, all
subjects being in state 0

on Trial 1 and eventually becoming absorbed in state
2 when the complete

problem is solved.
The Trabasso and Bower model is directly applicable to those
subjects

who were required to solve each problem by first learning to
classify
stimuli on
CC).

i^he

basis of the four relevant attribute combinations (Group

Of especial interest is the assumption of the model that responses

prior to the last error are stationary and independent observations from
a binomial series.

Trabasso and Bower found that, in contradiction to the

above assumptions, response sequences were neither stationary nor independent.

These authors suggested the possibility that these results were pro-

duced by some terminal paired-associate learning that was necessary to
connect the correct responses to the four relevant stimulus combinations.
This occurs because of a lack of symmetry in response assignments.

In

order to overcome this problem it was suggested that the paired-associate

learning coiild be minimized by utilizing two-component responses (e.g.,
Al, A2, Bl, B2) which mirror the logical structure of the four stimulus

combinations.

Since subjects in Group CC were reqiiired to use the truth-

table format in reporting their responses (i.e., TT, TF, FT, FF), the

data from these subjects provided a test of this suggestion.

A final

purpose of the present study, then, was to determine the applicability of
the Trabasso and Bower assumptions to the pretraining data on the

learning of contingencies.
Method
Subjects and design.

— Students

from introductory psychology served

as subjects as part of the course requirement.

Students were randomly

13
assigned to one of nine training conditions derived by combining the three
methods for learning contingencies and their assignment to response

categories (complete learning (CL), successive contingency learning (CC),
and conciirrent contingency learning (CR))

mth

the three hypothesis require-

ments (no hypothesis (NH), explicit hypothesis (EH), and implicit hypothesis
(IH)),

There were 12 subjects assigned to each of the above nine condi-

tions for a total of 108 subjects.

The experiment consisted of

txro

parts.

During Part I each subject

received three consecutive problems based on three different nies
jimction, inclusive disjunction, and biconditional.

:

con-

Each of two subjects

in each treatment combination received one of the six possible orders of

presentation.

A fourth rule, affirmation was used as an example of con-

ceptual rules, and explained during initial instructions.

Part II involved

the transfer of half the subjects in each of the nine conditions to a

problem presented under the complete learning procedure.

The other

half of the subjects v/ere given a fourth problem under their initial
training procedure.

The problem given during transfer was based on the

second rule presented during Part I.

The two relevant attributes for

each problem were counterbalanced for problem, order, relevant rule, and
subjects.

Materials,— The stimulus patterns were geometric designs drawn on

3x5

inch white cards.

dimensions.

Stimulus patterns varied on four binary-valued

Dimensions and their values were:

number, one and

tvro figxires;

form, circle and square;

size, large and small; and color, red and

blue.
of the dimensions was left
A sample card listing aXi possible values

exposed for the subjects reference at all times.

After each problem was

containing a detailed
solved the subject was presented with a rule card

explanation of the rule used during that problem.

Task and procedure. —Daring Part I subjects trained under
CC were
reqxiired to classify patterns into four categories
designated TT, TF, FT,

and FF according to the presence or absence of the

tv;o

relevant attributes

(these designations conform to the true-false notation in Table
1).

After

16 consecutive successes subjects continued to classify patterns into

these four categories and in addition, were required to learn to designate
each pattern as positive or negative on the basis of the relevant rule for

that problem imtil reaching a criterion of l6 consecutive successes on
this aspect of the problem.

Subjects trained under CR were required,

on each trial, to classify patterns into one of the four categories noted
above, received feedback on the correctness of their classification,

and then designated that pattern as positive or negative and received

feedback on the latter response assignment.

The criterion for CR was 16

consecutive successes; a success was recorded if the subject classified
a stimulus correctly on the basis of both the true-false assignment and

the positive-negative assignment.

Finally, subjects in CL were required

to classify patterns into either the positive or negative category.

criterion for CL was also 16 consecutive successes.

The

During Part II

subjects were presented with a problem based on the second rule presented

during Part I.

Ha f were run under the procedure followed during Part I,
"l

half were transferred to the complete learning procedure.
One third of the subjects in each of the above three training groups

were assigned to one of the three hypothesis conditions.

Those subjects

who were required to state their hypothesis verbally on each trial (EH)

were asked to indicate x^hich two attributes they
response upon.
CR.

vreTe

basing their

The responses were those described above for CL, CC, and

Those subjects who were assigned to the implicit hypothesis group (IH)

were presented each of the l6 stimuli in the stimulus population one at a
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time and asked to classify each stimulus without
feedback.

The classi-

fications during blank trials were those appropriate
to their training
condition, that is, CL, CC, or CR.

These subjects were then presented

each of the 16 sticauli again but this time received
feedback after each
classification.
Finally, in order to insure an equal occurrence of each of
the four

contingencies
16 trials.

,

the stimulus population was randomized over each block
of

This procedure differs from the Haygood and Bo\irne (I965)

method which insured the occurrence of at least one instance of each
of

the four contingencies during each block of I6 trials and which equated
the

stiraulvis

sequence for positive and negative instances.

Since recent

evidence (Haygood & Devine, 196?) indicated that it is the proportion of

TT instances that influences behavior, and not the proportion of positive
instances, the procediire employed in the present study was adopted.

Results and Discussion

Rule and Problem Difficulty
With one exception (Laughlin & Jordan, 196?), previous research has
indicated that the order of difficulty among the conceptual rules employed

in the present study is, from most to least difficult, biconditional,
inclusive disjunction, and conjunction.

In the one exception, Laughlin

and Jordan found disjunction to be the most difficult.

difficulty in the present study is in accord

The order of

vnLth the usual findings as

indicated by separate analyses of variance performed on errors and trials
to criterion (p

.01),

Laughlin and Jordan suggested that the reason

for this discrepancy might be due to either the use of binary- valued
dimensions or the use of the selection paradigm which were employed in

their investigation.

Since in the present study binary dimensions were

employed but the reception paradigm was used, it may be concluded, until
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a more direct test is made, that the discrepancy is the result
of the

above authors choice of the selection paradigm.
Analyses of variance on errors and trials revealed a
significant

improvement in performance across problems (p

<

.025).

Analysis of trials,

but not errors, also indicated a significant interaction of rules
and contingency training

(p^

.O5).

This result

\J3.s

due to the fact that

differences in difficulty among rules, as reported above, were greatly

reduced under CC and CR.

Pretraining and Transfer Results
The results of pretraining subjects to classify stimuli according to
contingencies are shown in Table 3 which presents errors and trials to

criterion for the nine training combinations as well as the results of
the transfer problem which was presented under the complete learning
procedure.

Subjects who were trained under CL committed more errors

(p <• ,05) and needed more trials to reach criterion (p <_ .001) than did

those subjects trained under CC and CR,
There are two possible explanations for these results; first, con-

sider the follomng analysis.

Subjects trained under CL must discover

both the rule and relevant attributes.

On the other hand, subjects in

CC and CR, although they too must discover both unknovms, have these two

problems separated for them by the structure of the experimental task.

The contingency coding portion of each problem represents a task that is
equivalent to attribute identification since the rule (sort on the basis
of the presence or absence of the two relevant attributes) is know.

The

remainder of the problem is equivalent to a rule learning task in that
subjects must learn how the four combinations of the two relevant

attributes are distributed into the positive and negative categories.

The major difference between CC and CR is that the former group has

1?

Table 3

Errors and Trials to Criterion During Transfer and
Training

Training
Trials

Errors

CL

cc

CR

NH
IH
EH

36.2
38.8
^3.6

23.9
20 6
17.^

20.3

26.8

23.8

28.3

Avg.

39.6

20.7

18.2

CL

cc

CR

15.3
15.9
15.8

12.7
10.5
9.9

16.6
7.7
18.0

1^.8
11.4
14.6

15.7

11.1

9.8
22.0
12.1

12.7
12.7
12.7

11.2
9.3
9.5

11.2
14.7
11.4

1^.7

12.7

10.0

Transfer

NH
IH
EH

28.0
55.8
26.1

J^5.6

21.3
^7.3

31.0
25.6
57.5

Avg,

36.7

38.1

38.0

3^.8
3^.2
43.6

.
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already learned to classify each stimulus according to the four
contingencies, whereas Group CR, until this aspect of the problem is
solved,

are given this information on each trial by the experimenter through
the

feedback process employed.

Both groups must then discover whether each

of the four contingencies is a positive or negative instance of the concept.

The above analysis may be interpreted to indicate that these findings are
in agreement ;d-th Haygood and Bourne's (I965) conclusion that the two
processes under CL combine in such a way as to make learning more difficult, than would be the case if the two processes simply combined in an

additive fashion.

A second explanation

is that under CC and CR subjects are receiving

more information from the experimenter on each trial than under CL.

In

CL subjects are merely informed on each trial whether a stimulus belongs
in the positive or negative category.

Depending upon the

rvCLe,

this means

that both, one, or none of the two relevant attributes may be present.

In CC and CR, however, subjects are receiving information about the

presence or absence of the relevant attributes.

Such information can be

utilized by efficient subjects to make comparisons between stimuli from
one trial to the next.

The most striking example would be when an instance

of TT is presented on two successive trials and the values of the two

irrelevant dimensions changed on these two trials.

An observant subject

would have learned that the two unchanged attributes represented the TT
instance of the relevant pair.

The learning of the assignment of con-

tingencies to positive and negative categories probably is no more

difficult than a simple paired-associate task with four items to be

learned
problem
We now turn to consideration of the results of the transfer

which was run under the complete learning procedure.

Bourne (196?)
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previously had found that subjects pretrained on contingencies
performed

better than subjects who did not receive such training.

The results of

the transfer problem in the present study cannot be interpreted to
support
a similar conclusion.

Analyses of variance performed on errors and trials

to criterion, did not disclose any reliable difference between subjects

previously trained under CC and CR, and those subjects trained under CL.
These results are presented in Table 3 under Transfer.

The failure to

find any transfer following contingency training would appear to conflict

with Bourne's findings.

However, in the Bourne study, subjects v^ere

switched to a rule learning task rather than a complete learning problem
as in the present study.

If the relevant attributes are known, the useful-

ness of the truth-table strategy may be more apparent to subjects, vrhereas

under complete learning, subjects may resort to other as yet untried
strategies, or perhaps some mixture of the two.

Whether subjects were using the truth-table strategy during transfer
can not be determined from these results.

In order to determine what

would be expected if subjects were proceeding according to the truthtable strategy, a computer simulation of the strategy proposed by Haygood
and Bourne was performed on a high speed digital computer.

Each single

run through the sim\LLation program represented the simulation of a single
subject.

For each of the three conceptual rules employed in the present

study, the simi:ilation procedure to be described below was performed 18

times to correspond to the actual number of subjects run during transfer.

For each run, the input data consisted of the stimulus sequence to be
used, the two attributes selected as relevant for that simulated subject,

the conceptual rule, and the array of positive and negative assignments
relevant
of the entire stimulus population as determined by the choice of

attributes and conceptual rule.

In additon, an array of all possible
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pairs of attributes which coiad be obtained from the existing
stimulus

population under the restriction that each attribute vms from
a different
stimulus dimension was read into the computer, and was available
as the

hypothesis pool from which the simulated subjects selected sample attribute
pairs for testing.

Each run was initialized by the random selection of

a pair of attributes from the hypothesiis pool, e.g., red and square.

A

contingency array was established which identified each of the 16 possible
stimuli in terms of the truth-table format, e.g., red and square (TT),
red and not sqiiare (TF), not red and square (FT), and not red and not

square (FF).

The first stimulus in the sequence was then presented.

The

program proceeded to scan the contingency array until a match was made

with the just presented stimulus.

The contingency identification, e.g.,

TT, associated with that stimulus was noted as well as whether that con-

tingency had been assigned a response label (positive or negative).
If no response label was found, a designation of positive or negative

was randomly generated.
ment (reinforcement).

The program then presented the correct assignIf reinforcement agreed with the response label

just generated, the entire contingency array

v:as

scanned to locate each

of the other three instances of that contingency, and that response label

was assigned to each of these instances.

If the reinforcement did not

agree with the response label generated by the simulated subject, that

label was changed to agree with the reinforcement, and the scanning and
labeling procedure was then carried out,

Folloid.ng this the next stimulus

was presented and the above procedure was repeated.

This procedure was

continued until a trial on which a scan of the contingency array produced
a response label which did not agree ;d.th the reinforcement given on

that trial.

Since a response label could not be retrieved from a scan

of the contingency array unless prior reinforcement of that contingency
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instance had occurred, this discrepancy between response
label and rein-

forcement constituted rejection of the hypothesis that
the attribute pair
encoded in the contingency array was the correct or relevant
pair.

A

new pair of attributes was then selected from the entire pool
of attribute
pairs, and the simulation continued.

On each trial counters kept track

of the number of errors and trials and the number of consecutive
successes.

The run was terminated as soon as the criterion of 16 consecutive successes

was reached.

The data from these simulations

v:as

average number of errors and trials to solution.

used to compute the
The performance of

these simulated subjects in terms of average number of errors (^1.2) and
trials to solution (77.2) when compared with the obtained results shown

in Table 3, clearly indicate that such a strategy is highly inefficient

compared to actual performance.

There may be several reasons for this finding not the least of which
is that in the present study, subjects simply did not resort to the truth

table strategy.

First, subjects may have learned the truth-table strategy

but discarded it in favor of more efficient methods.

In fact, if a

subject knows the strategy, then a modified version in which the subject

tested two dimensions at a time rather than two attributes would be more
efficient.

Such a strategy is possible because of the symmetry of binary

dimensions.

If an inconsistent response assignment is obtained for any

of the four attribute combinations defined by the two dimensions selected,

those dimensions could be eliminated as the relevant pair.

Any incon-

sistent assignment would imply that one or both of these two dimensions
are irrelevant.

This is time because for any of the four cotribinations

of attributes, response assignments would be consistent no matter which

combination was chosen by the experimenter to be relevant.

Using this

method the subject is dealing with a set of possibilities one fourth as
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large as would be the case V7hen testing pairs of
attributes.

In effect,

the subject eliminates four pairs of attributes
rather than one pair each

time an inconsistent assignment occurs.

The subject would continue to

select and eliminate pairs of dimensions until the problem
is solved.

A second reason for the inefficiency of the truth table strategy

is

that simulation was conducted under the assumption of no memory
for

previously tested attribute pairs.

That is, subjects were assumed to

resample frqm the entire population of pairs of attributes.

Although

this assumption may not be unreasonable as a first approximation, it
is

unrealistic in the present study in the light of recent evidence of the
role of memory in concept learning (c.f.

,

Chumbley, 196?).

It is more

reasonable to assume that memory was an important factor in the present
study since the stimulus population was quite small and the task was selfpaced.

Subjects should have little difficulty under these conditions

remembering a number of previous attribute pairs already tested and
eliroinated from consideration.

In other words, subjects, up to some limit,

are sampling without replacement.

These results in themselves, do not,

of course, preclude the use of the truth table strategy in the present
study, but merely the sampling assumption employed.

Evidence to be

discussed in the next section bears more directly on the

vise

of the truth

table strategy in the present experiment.
Finally,

tx^o

other results obtained during transfer should be noted.

Analysis of variance performed on trials to criterion but not errors

revealed that the order of difficulty among conceptual rules found during

training still obtained during transfer (p < .001).

There was also an

interaction between contingency training and hypothesis requirements
(p

<

.01).

Subjects previously trained under CL and IH took longest to

solve the transfer problem with NH and EH subjects finding the problem
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easier.

This result was reversed for subjects trained iinder CC and CR.

Hypothesis Behavior
In this section, we consider the analysis of the behavior of those
subjects required to explicitly state their hypotheses (EH) and those

subjects run under the implicit hypothesis condition (IH).

A finding of major interest is that the results of analyses of
Variances performed on errors and trials did not reveal any reliable
differences

,i

between subjects not required to provide information on

their hypotheses, and those subjects in the explicit and implicit hypothesis
conditions.

Although it is possible that this finding is peculiar to the

present study, the result is certainly not trivial, but has important
empirical and theoretical implications.

The procedure represents a

valuable technique for obtaining information, and is in keeping with the
arguments presented by Battig and Bourne (196?) for maximizing observable

behavior in complex tasks such as concept learning.

Such a procedure is

also valuable because many mathematical models of the concept learning
process assume that subjects are selecting hypotheses on the basis of
aspects of the stimuli to which they are exposed, and subjects stating

their hypotheses would provide a clearer picture of the sampling process,
and their preferences for particular dimensions; which for the sake of

mathematical convenience are assumed to be equally salient.
Another advantage of having subjects state their hypotheses is that
typically
this procedure permits a direct assessment of the assumption

incorporated into mathematical models that subjects stay with the same
hypothesis whenever they are correct.

The reasoning behind this assumption

information that would
is that a correct response does not provide any
hypothesis; that is, if the
give a subject any basis for changing his

than with his current hypothesis.
subject is correct he can do no better
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In at least one

stucJy, hoi^ever,

in contradiction to this assumption it

was found that subjects do change their hypotheses
after correct trials
(Suppes & Schlag-Rey, I965).

The conclusion of these authors was that

subjects simultaneously are testing several hypotheses, only
one of which
is overt on any trial.

Positive reinforcement of the overt hypothesis

may represent negative reinforcement of other covert hypotheses causing
a change in the hierarchy of the hypothesis pool.

It has also been

assumed thati each time the subject is incorrect he returns the disconfirmed

hypothesis to the pool and resamples.

In order to determine the validity of these assumptions for the present
study, the data of subjects in each of the three explicit hypothesis con-

ditions (CLEH, CCEH, CREH)

vras

examined.

Table k presents, for each of

the three training conditions, problem by problem analysis of the probability

that a subject retained the same (S) hypothesis given that he was correct
(c), P(SlC), and the probability that a subject selected a different (D)

hypothesis given that he was wrong

(//),

P(Dl

i-/).

Also included are the

totals for each training condition, and total proportions pooled over

problems and groups.

For groups CC and CR these statistics were computed

only with respect to responses on contingency assignments.
It is clear from Table 4 that subjects did change their hypothesis

after correct trials (P = .11), and retained an incorrect hypothesis

following error trials (P = .15).

These results run counter to the

intuitatively reasonable assumption incorporated in previous models that
subjects retain a correct hypothesis and always resample after errors.

Although subjects, if sampling with replacement, could resample the same
hypothesis, it is highly unlikely that such a high proportion would occur

by chance alone.

Also, as noted above, it is highly likely that in the

present study subjects are sampling vrithout replacement.

Table ^ does

Table ^

Proportion of Subjects Retaining the Same (S) Hypothesis
When Correct (C), P(S|C), and Selecting a Different (D)
Hypothesis 'v!hen v^rong (vJ), P

Problem

Group

CLEH

CCEH

CREH

1

2

3

4

Total

P(D| W)

.83
.86

.89
•
.81

.90
.76

.93
.74

.85
.80

P(S( C)
P(D| W)

.91
.79

.95
.95

1.00
.97

.95
.98

.95
.92

P(S(C)

.83
.84

.98
.82

.77
.90

.89
.90

.85
.86

.84
.84

.91
.84

.88
.87

.93
.84

.89
.85

P(S| C)

P(D|V/)

Total P(S(C)
P(D( W)
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reveal

that the general trend in CL and CC is for subjects to become

more likeQ;/ to retain a correct hypothesis as training continues, and
similarly, as training continues, subjects in CC and CR are more likely
to discard an incorrect hypothesis.

The closeness of the two statistics suggests that a similar process
may be responsible for both discrepancies.

One possible explanation is

that these deviations from optimal strategy represent a lag in the processing
of information from previous trials.

The subject is "biding his time"

while processing and does not make the change until enough information has

been processed for him to make his decision about a new hypothesis.

In

the interim, the subject retains his current hypothesis; thus a correct

hypothesis is changed because of a delayed decision, and an incorrect

hypothesis is retained until enough information has been accrued to make
a decision.

We now turn to further evidence on the proposal that subjects come to

employ the truth table strategy.

The results to be presented below

represent an analysis of the response protocols of subjects in the three

IH groups.

In these conditions subjects were presented alternating series

of each of the 16 stimuli, each stimulus being presented one at a time.

The first series was presented ^>dthout any feedback, the second series
was the customary one in which feedback was presented after each classification.

If subjects are classifying stimuli in CL on the basis of the

presence or absence of the two attributes they believe to be relevant, it
should be possible to determine this, since each instance of the four
contingencies, TT, TF, FT, and FF will be treated alike.

The relevant data

are presented in Table 5«
stimuli
For each of the groups discussed below, classification of
for that
during blank trials were made in accordance with the requirement

Table 5

Proportion of Subjects Giving Consistent Respons
Assignments During Blank Trials for Each
Training Condition and Each Problem

Problem

Group

1

2

3

CLIH

.18

.26

.1^

.15

.19

CCIH

.58

.61

.68

.75

.63

CRIH

.77

.95

.79

.75

.80

.56

.53

.5^

.51

Total

Total
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group, that is. CL, CC, or CR.

Looking first at CLIH it is obvious that

few subjects classified stimuli on these trials in any manner
consistent

with the possible pool of two-attribute hypotheses.

Further, there is no

indication that subjects learn to do so across problems, if
anything,
there is a decrease in the proportion of consistent classifications.

A

possible explanation other than lack of attention or forgetting of the
hypothesis, is that subjects are entertaining hypotheses more complex

than that demanded by the task.

The situation is somewhat better in CCIH

where consistent classifications are made .63 of the time, and there is
improvement across problems.

However, for this group the task is more

structured than in CL so that any complex hypotheses as postulated for

CL subjects are less likely, and more consistent patterns of responding

would be expected.

Another reason for not assuming that these results

reflect forgetting of the hypothesis is that subjects in CRIH are even
more consistent than those in CC, and subjects in CR must also recall

whether they classified each stimulus as positive or negative thus imposing
a larger memory load.

On balance it would appear that even when the

problem is structured in such a way as to produce a series of responses
consistent with the truth table strategy there is considerable failure to
do so.

Analysis of Four-Category Data
As noted above, one third of the subjects in the present experiment

were required to learn the three conceptual rules in two phases.

During

the first phase, subjects were required to classify patterns into the four
categories defined by the presence or absence of the

attributes using the truth table format.

tvro

relevant

In this system of reporting

responses, the designation TT meant that the subject believed that boty

relevant attributes were present, TF that one relevant attribute was
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present and the second attribute absent and so on.

During the second

phase of these probletns subjects were required to
learn to classify stimulus patterns into positive and negative response categories on
the basis
of the rule selected for that problem.

Until subjects begin the second

phase in this condition, they are confronted with a four-category
concept

learning task as studied by Trabasso and Bower (196^).
Analysis of this data for the first problem presented each subject

was to have ,been performed in terms of the Trabasso and Bower three-state

Markov model described in the introduction.

Apart from the consideration

that the present data afforded a further test of the Trabasso and Bower

interpretation, there was the additional consideration that the use of the

truth table format of reporting responses, provided a test of the above
authors' suggestion that their finding of nonstationarity and nonindependence

resulted from terminal paired-associate learning, due to the fact that the
responses used in their study (1, 2, 3, ^), did not mirror the four

combinations of the two relevant dimensions as would txro-component responses such as used in the present study (TT, TF, FT, FF).
Due to a procedural error to be described below, the Trabasso and

Bower model could not be tested against the present data, however, the
results of analysis of presolution data will be reported.

Before con-

sidering these results, however, we shall describe a second, more

parsimonious model, which derives from consideration of the structure of
the truth table, and for which a partial test was available.

If a subject

has discovered the two relevant attributes (Category TT), then he is

able to correctly classify all stimuli using the truth table format,

A simple strategy would be to select

a pair of attributes to be classified

as TT, and classify all stimuli on this basis until the pair has been

disconfirmed.

The subject then selects another pair as his hypothesis
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and continues until he has discovered the relevant pair attributes.

The

subject may be conceptualized as being in one of two states on any
trial;

a selection state in which he selects the correct pair of attributes with

probability h, and a solution state in wlaich the subject has discovered
the two relevant attributes and has solved the problem.

It is further

assumed that subjects can solve the problem only after an error.

The model

is consistent with previous hypothesis -testing models which have been

applied to

tihe

learning of unidimensional concepts with the exception

that subjects are testing hypotheses about two values rather than one.

Because of the procedural error to be described below, any statistic

which involves error rate is inappropriate.

The procedural error occurred

as the result of an attempt to avoid confusion on the part of the subject,

with respect to what was meant by the experimenter's reply of either TF
of FT,

In order to avoid confusion, each subject, when presented with

the list of dimensions and attributes, was advised that the order of

reporting would correspond to the order listed on their card.

be seen

belox-r

As will

this procedure leads to variation in the subject's error

rate as a function of the eixperinenter

'

s

selection of the two relevant

dimensions in combination with the subject's choice of dimensions.

In order to illustrate the problem, we consider the case in which the
subject has selected one of the two correct dimensions and is always

correct with respect to reporting true or false on that dimension.

Let

us label the four dimensions I, II, III, IV to represent the order of

reporting utilized by the experimenter.

Table 6 illustrates the possible

outcomes given the two dimensions chosen by the experimenter to be
relevant, the two dimensions selected by the subject, and the error rates

corresponding to each combination of these two.

Table 6

Error Rates Given Possible Orders of Report*
Relevant
Combination
1,11

Subject's

I.X**

II .X
I, III

Error
Kate

I»x

•

r5

.'50

II, III

III, IV
I, IV

•

fj

ItX

x,IV
II,

in

I. II

II, IV
I, III

II, IV

III,IV

*

III, IV

7*5

I. II

7*5

II, III

.50

x.IV

.50

x.III

.75

x,IV

.50

Roman numerals identify dimensions according to order reported

**x represents any irrelevant dimension
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It can be seen from Table 6 that any time the subject
reports the
correct dimension in the order opposite to the order reported by
the
experimenter, his error rate will be .75; on all other occasions
his

error rate will be .50.

listed in Table 6,

As an example, consider the second possibility

The experimenter has chosen dimensions I and II and

the subject dimensions II and x.

Thus the subject always reports

dimension II first x^hereas the experimenter always reports it second.

Let

us assume that the second dimension selected by the subject is dimension

III (the analysis holds

for"

all cases in which the order is reversed).

Using the true (T) - false (F) notation, and keeping in mind that the
subject is always correct on dimension II, it may be seen from Table 7
that only two of the possible combinations will lead to a correct answer;
thus error rate is .75.

A similar analysis will indicate that when the

subject's order of reporting corresponds to experimenter's order error

probability will be .50.

We now turn to consideration of a statistic predicted by the hypothesis
model that is independent of error rate.

If the above assumptions are

correct then the cumulative distribution of errors, Pr(T^ k), is given by

Pr(T^

k) = 1 - (1 - h)

since the subject can only solve the problem followjjig an error, and this
error is the final error with probability h.

The cumiilative probability

distribution of errors is presented in Table 8 for selected values of T,

The value of h was estimated from the equation for the expected total errors
E(T) = 1/h

and was found to be ,09 for the present data.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test

The largest discrepancy (.07)

was used to evaluate goodness of fit.

occurred at the value T = ^, but is not large enough to cause rejection of
the null hypothesis (N = 36 cases, p

>

.20).
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Table 7

Illustration of Possible Outcomes with Reversed
Order of Reporting*
Dimensions

Relevant

I rrelevant

Outcome

I

II

T

T

T

Correct

T

T

F

Wrong

T

F

T

Wrong

T

F

F

Wrong

F

T

T

Wrong

F

T

F

Wrong

F

F

T

Wrong

F

F

F

Correct

Subject

III

is reporting II and III and is always correct on II

Table 8

Distribution of Total Errors, T

Pr(T^
k

k)

Observed

Predicted

0-3

.250

^-7

.472

.^33

8-11

.611

.6if6

D^-15

.750

.757

16-19

.833

R3/J.

20-23

,m

.886

2^-27

.972

.922

28-31

.972

.9^7

32-35

1.000

.964

Maximum Discrepancy = .073 at T = 4
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Both the two-state hypothesis

oiodel and the

three-state subproblem

model predict stationarity and independence for the
appropriate response
sequences.

In the latter case, the assumptions refer to
response sequences

derived from each subproblem; that is, responses were scored
as correct or
incorrect in

terras

of each relevant dimension providing two response

protocols for each subject.

The results of the analyses of presolution

data were mixed for each model; the data indicated nonstationarity,
as
previously found by Trabasso and Bower, while the assumption of independence
was confirmed.

We turn first to the evidence on the subproblem model.

For the stationarity test, the success probability during the first half
(.5^1) was compared to the success probability during the second half
(.623) prior to the last error.

This represents a significant increase

^

in success rate (t = 2.^, df =58, p

.02).

For the test of independence,

the conditional probability of a success was .579 following a success,
and .552 following an error.

The

based on IO69 observations does not

permit rejection of the null hypothesis (X^ = .77, df = 1, p

>

.20).

The finding of nonstationarity despite the use of two-component responses
implies that a process other than terminal paired-associate learning may

be responsible.

One such candidate, also suggested by Trabasso and

Boi'ier,

may be that retention of the first subproblem is interfered with by the

learning of the second subproblem, and that this effect is reduced during
the second half of learning.

With respect to the two-state model the same results were obtained
as for the three-state model.

Again there was a significant increase in

success rate from the first half (.3^) to the second half (.^79) of the

problem

(t

= 2.82, df = 32, p <.01).

gave similar results.

The test for independence also

The conditional probability of a success following

a success was .^15 and following an error was .379.

The

based on 637

observations did not reach significance (X^ = .85, df = 1, p > .20).
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Sumtnary and Conclusions

The results of the present experiment fail to
confirm the assumption

that subjects are utilizing a truth table strategy
as proposed by Haygood
and Bourne (I965).

The possibility remains that this finding is
true

only in the case where binaiy dimensions are used and/or
memory is an
important factor.

If the memory assumption is the only fault then it is

merely necessary to modify the sampling assumptions of the
theory.

More

likely is the possibility that, as suggested by Haygood and Bourne,
the
truth table strategy would emerge with the use of highly practiced
subjects

for whom mastery of the rules can reasonably be assured.

A more appropriat e

test of the Haygood and Bourne model would be an investigation of complet e

learning under conditions identical to those the above authors employed
in drawing their conclusions (i.e., where each of the k stimulus dimensions
has at least three values), and to compare this condition with one in

which subjects are explicitly instructed and trained in the use of the
truth table strategy.

The sampling assumption could also be examined by

asking half the subjects to state their hypothesis on each trial.

The present results also conflict with previous assumptions that
subjects always retain a correct hypothesis and always discard an in-

correct hypothesis.

Two possible explanations were discussed; the existence

of a covert hierarchy of hypotheses, and a delay in the processing of

information from previous trials.

The first possibility may be tested

by asking subjects to state, on each trial, all hypotheses which they are
considering at that time, and to rate each on a scale of confidence.
The second possibility may be evaluated by asking subjects to state on
each trial the basis for their current response as well as all those

hypotheses which they have just eliminated.

The change of a correct

hypothesis should be reflected by its inclusion in the eliminated list

on that trial.

Similarly, an incorrect hypothesis
woxild not appear in

the list if retained on that trial but
would occur on a later trial.
The finding in the present study that the
hypothesis groups did not

differ encourages the use of such procedures
as these, although a control
group should be included until these results
have been replicated.

Finaiy, the replication of Trabasso and Bower's
finding of nonstationarity in the four-category task when two-component
responses are
used indicates that another explanation must be found, such as
a test of
the possibility that this result is due to interference of the
first

subproblem learned due to subsequent learning of the second
subproblem.
This possibility can be tested by the simple procedure of
informing subjects on each trial of the correct half of the two-category
response once

they have achieved criterion on that dimension.
In summary, the results of the present experiment a) do not support
the truth table strategy assumption, b) support the usefulness of asking

subjects their hypotheses, c) suggest that assumptions of previous models

may be in error about the

v:ay

subjects process hypotheses on correct and

incorrect trials, and d) again disconfirm the stationarity assumption of
the Trabasso and Bower (1964) model.
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APPENDIX A
Summary of Analysis of Variance on Trials to
Criterion and Errors, Training

Source of Variance

Between Ss
Contingency (C)
Hypotheses (H)
Sequence (Sq)
C X H
Sq int
Error

Within Ss
Problems (P)
Ordinal Position (O)

df

Total

Errors
F-ratio

107
2
2
5

216
2
2

C X

C X
H X
H X
C X
C X
Error

Trials
F-ratio

8
8
180
323

3^.86***

3.18*

12,37***
7,87***
2.47*

5,03**
4.51*

^0
APPENDIX B

Summary of Analysis of Variance on Trials to
Criterion and Errors, Transfer

Source of Variance

Contingency (C)

I^otheses
Rules (R)
0 X H
C X R

H X R
C X H X R
Error
Total

(H)

df
2
2
2

k

8
27

53

Trials
F-ratio

11.02***
4.32**

Errors
F-ratio
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APPENDIX C

Blank Trials Procedure
One third of all subjects in the three contingency
training conditions; CL, CC, CR, were run under the implicit
hypothesis requirement in

which blank trials were employed.

There are a number of different methods

that may be employed under the description of blank trials; in
each case
the designation refers to the presentation of stimuli without
feedback

from the exporimenter.

The description that will be given below for CL

holds for the other

training conditions, CC and CR, with the only

tv70

exception that each group was required to give those responses designated

for that condition.

Thus subjects in CL made positive and negative

classifications during blank trials, as well as during reinforced
(feedback) trials; subjects in CC classified each stimulus on the basis

of the truth-table format until that phase of the problem had been solved,
and then classified stimuli into positive and negative categories for the

remainder of the problem.

Subjects under CR requirements made both

truth-table and positive-negative category responses during blank and

feedback trials.

With the exception of the response requirements, the

procedure was as fo]J.ows,

Each problem was begun by presenting the first

stimulus in the sequence and asking the subject to classify that stimulus.

Following the subject's response, the next stimulus was presented vdthout

any designation by the experimenter as to the correctness of the subject's
previous classification.

Each of the remaining stimuli were likewise

presented one at a time for classification without feedback, until the
subject had classified each of the l6 stimuli included in the stimulus

population used in the present study.

Following classification of the

last stimulus to be presented, the first stimulus was presented again
and the subject classified that stimulus for the second time.

Following
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the subject's response, the experimenter
informed the subject of the
correct classification. This procedure,
responding with feedback continued
until each of the 16 stimuli had again been
presented. Following reinforcement to the response to the last stimulus presented,
another series of

blank trials was given using a different random
order of the 16 stimuli.

Each series of 16 blank trials was thus followed by
presentation of the
same 16 stimuli in the same order but with feedback.

This alternation of

16 blank trials with 16 reinforced trials continued until the
problem was

completed.

^3
APPENDIX D

Instructions

General
This is an experiment on
ment.

ho\<r

people learn to classify their environ-

Your task in this experiment will be to learn to
classify a series

of stimuli, which will shortly be described to you, into
a number of

different categories.

At first you will just be guessing, but after
each

response that you make, you will be informed whether or not you
were
If you were incorrect, you will be informed vxhich category
was

correct.

the correct one.
•

If you pay attention to this information, which you

receive about the correctness of your choices, you will eventually discover
a rule, or principle, which will enable you to classify each stimulus

correctly.

Before describing the exact procedure which

vrill

be followed during

this experiment, let me familiarize you with the stimuli which you will

be asked to classify.
(The entire stimulus population was then displayed to the subject one at
a time.

It was pointed out that each stimulus was completely described

in terms of the values assumed by the four dimensions.

The particvQ.ar

dimensions and their values were designated and the subject was given a

reference card which contained the stimulus dimensions and their values,)

Your task is to discover into which of two categories each of the
stimuli which were just described is to be placed.

One category is

defined as all those stimuli which are examples of a concept which I will
select at the beginning of a problem,

I will shortly give you an example

which will clarify what is meant by a concept.
include all the remaining stimuli.
not examples of the concept.

The other category will

That is, all those stimuli which are

The concept itself is determined by two
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features.

First, the concept is defined in terms of one or more
of the

stinixaus values; second, the concept is defined on the
basis of a rule

which specifies the relationship between the values.
Let's consider an illustration of how a concept may be defined.

A very simple conceptual rule is called the

riile

of "affirn^ation".

This rule specifies that the value chosen to define the concept, and we

refer to this value as the relevant value, must be present in order for
a stimulus to be an instance, or example, of the concept.

consider a choice of

as the relevant value.

For example,

The rule of

affirmation states that if a stimulus has this value, that is, if the
value is present, the stimulus is an example of the concept
If that value is absent, the stimulus is not an example.

the stimuli and I

vri.ll

,

Let us go through

ask you to classify each stimulus as an example

or non-example of this concept.

If a stimulus is an example of the concept

we shall use the label positive to symbolize that the stimulus
positive example of the concept.

is a

If the value is absent, we shall use

the label "negative" to symbolize that the stimulus is not an example of

the concept,

(Each of the 16 stimuli vxere then classified as positive

or negative by the subject on the basis of the affirmation rule and the

value selected for that subject)
Do you have any questions?

Now let me describe the exact procedure that will be followed during
this experiment.
solve.

You will be presented with four separate problems to

The solution to each problem will be based upon a concept defined

in terms of two values, where each value is from a different dimension,
and upon a conceptual rule which specifies which of the four combinations

of the presence or absence of these two values are examples of the concept
(belong in the positive category), and which combinations are not

^5
examples of the concept (belong in the negative category).

For any two

values, each of the stimuli that will be presented
represents one of the

four combinations of the presence or absence of these
two values.

For

example, if the two values selected for a particular
problem were

then each stimulus is either

^^t not

,

not

and

and
,

and not

and not

Let us illustrate this by going through the stimuli again.

Your task is to discover which stimuli are to bo categorized as belonging
in the positive category and which stimuli are to be categorized as

belonging in the negative category.
.

thing«:

This means that you must discover two

what the rule being used is and to which two values the rule is

being applied.

In all there will be three problems each based upon a different rule.
Follov/ing these problems, you will be given a fourth problem based upon

one of these three rules.

Are there any questions?

For all conditions except CLNH special instructions as described below were
added to the above instructions,

CLIH
The exact procedure that will be used is as follows.

I will present

each stimulus, one at a time, and ask you to give your best guess as to

whether that

stiraulxis is

or is not an example of the concept; you will

classify all of the stimuli without receiving any information from me as
to the correctness of your choice.

After you have classified all the

stimuli according to your best guess as to what the concept is, I will
again designate each

stiraulvis

as positive or negative.

This time, hox/ever,

you will be informed after each guess whether you were correct or incorrect.
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If you were incorrect you will be given the correct answer.

We will con-

tinue to alternate between classifying stimuli without any feedback and

with feedback,
CLEH

In addition to classifying each stimulus as positive or negative, I
want you to tell me vihich two values you are basing your response upon.
That is, which two values you believe are relevant to the solution of the
problem,

CCNH
The exact procedure that I want you to follow is this

:

As has

already been point out, the solution to each problem requires the discovery
of the relevant two values and the rule which assigns the four combinations
of the presence or absence of these values to positive and negative

categories.

Each problem will therefore be separated into two parts.

During the first part, your task is to discover which two values have

been selected to be relevant.

Each time a stimulus is presented you are

to classify that stimulus as being one of the four combinations of the

two values you believe to be relevant.

Here is a card which designates

the labels to be employed by you in categorizing each of the four possibilities.

(An explanation was given in the use of the truth- table format

displayed on the card, and it was pointed out that the TF and FT categories

would follow the order of dimensions listed on the reference card,)

After

you have solved this part of the problem, you will continue to designate
addition, you will
each stimulus using the truth-table format, but, in

negative example
designate whether you think each stimulus is a positive or

of the concept.

^7

CCIH

Following the general instructions and the
added instructions given
to CCNH. the added instructions given to
CLIH were given with the appropriate

modifications to include response requirements for
CCIH.
CCEH

Following the general instructions and the special
instructions given
CCNH, the added instructions given to CLEH were presented
with modification
to include response requirements appropriate to
CCEH.

CRNH
The exact procedure to be used is as follows:

As has already been

noted, the solution to each problem requires the discovery of the
relevant
two values and the rule which assigns the four combinations of the
presence
or absence of these values to positive and negative categories.

in this experiment will therefore be separated into two parts.

Each trial
During

the first part of each trial, you will designate each stimulus on the

basis of which of the four combinations of the two values you believe to

be relevant.

Here is a card which describes the responses you are to use

to make these designations.

(The card is presented and explained)

After

you have classified each stimulus on this basis, you will be informed of
the correct classification.

Following this information, you will then

designate whether you believe the stimulus belongs in the positive or

negative category.

You will then be informed of the correctness of your

classification,

CRIH
The instructions given to

CRM

were followed with the instructions

presented to CLIH with the modifications necessary to take into account
response requirements.

"

,
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CREH

Following instructions given to CRNH, the
instructions given to

CLEH were presented with the appropriate modifications
to include response
requirements

I

a

APPENDIX E

Number of Errors (E) and Trials (T) to
Solution for
Conceptual Rule; Biconditional (B), Conjunction
(C).
and Disjunction (D), Obtained from
Classification
of Stimuli into Positive and Negative
Categories for Groups CC and CR

-ge
I

C

E
5.2
2.6
3.2
3.7

T
2.7
5.8

AVG.

T
10.5
6.3
7.1
8.0

CRl^H

17.3

CRIH
CREH

8.

9.0
3.8
6.6
6.5

12.3
6.3
10.1
9.6

CCNH
CCIH
CCEH

AVG.

1^.8
13.6

1.3
3.3

AVG.

E
1.6
1.9
0.8

T

lA

8.9
4.6
4.8
6.1

E
^.3
1.6
2.5
2.7

4.4
5.8

3.7
2.0
2.1
2.6

5.7
2.4
4.4
4.2

14.4
9.4
20.0
14.6

5.7
3.8
8.4
5.9

14.7
8.2
15.0
12.6

6.8
3.3
6.5
5.5

T
7.4
5.5

E
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